Introduction
Sudden economic downturns, resulting from factors such as fiscal weakness, weak financial systems, changes in pric es of primary commodities, and natural disasters are a reality in many Less Developed Countries (LDCs), and will continue to be a concern in the future.
Countries in East Asia faced a massive economic contraction in 1998; Latin American countries generally had low or negative growth rates during the "lost decade" of the 1980s, and many countries in the region, including Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru faced sharp, precipitous drops in GDP; very steep economic downturns are also an unfortunate fact of life for many African countries.
There has been a recent surge in academic and policy interest in the effect of macroeconomic crises on household behavior. Of particular concern are household investments in human capital. An oft-made argument is that households who are unable to smooth consumption perfectly may cut back the expenditures they make on the education, health, and nutrition of their children during a crisis. The World Bank's flagship publication, World
Development Report 2000/01: Attacking Poverty, strikes a particularly dire note: "When a crisis strikes and households cannot borrow or when adult unemployment is high or wages low, children are pulled out of school and sent to work. The lost schooling leads to a lifelong loss in earning ability for these children. Failures in the credit or labor markets thus transmit poverty and vulnerability across generations" (World Bank 2001, p. 146 ; see also Lustig 2000) .
The theory of human capital suggests that macroeconomic crises can affect the total amount of schooling, the timing of this schooling, and the effort which is devoted to schoolwork.
In the standard neoclassical model of human capital investment, individuals acquire schooling until the (expected) marginal benefit to an additional year of education equals the marginal cost (Rosen 1977; Willis 1986 ).
The marginal benefit is given by the increase in the discounted expected stream of earnings resulting from one more year of schooling. The marginal cost of an additional year of schooling is given by the foregone income, and by direct private costs such as tuition and transportation. The marginal cost will be increasing in years of schooling (or age) if net forgone earnings or tuition increase with schooling. Borrowing constraints may be an additional cost of attending school because they prevent consumption smoothing (Becker 1964; also Jacoby 1994 for an analysis of Peru). Low-income households, in particular, are more likely to both be unable to borrow and to lack "internal finance" for education purposes.
What is the effect of an adverse macroeconomic shock on the schooling decision? In general, a crisis will depress current employment and wage prospects, and the opportunity cost of attending school represented will fall. Holding everything else equal, this should lead to an increase in human capital investment. But a macroeconomic shock could also make borrowing constraints more binding, and thus depress the total amount of schooling chosen.
When macroeconomic shocks are persistent, they may also depress expected lifetime earnings, and have an effect on the marginal benefit from schooling. If the lifetime earnings of all individuals are reduced by the same percentage, regardless of their schooling, then the marginal benefit associated with an additional year of schooling will be lower (by this same percentage). But crises need not have such a uniform across-the-board effect on expected earnings. For example, if the expected lifetime earnings for individuals with less education are disproportionately affected by the crisis, the marginal benefit to schooling could rise.
Insofar as they change the marginal costs of schooling, macroeconomic crises may also affect the timing and intensity of schooling-in particular, the extent to which children combine schooling with part-time employment. Finally, the effect of a crisis on the wages and employment prospects of adults in a household may also have an effect on the schooling and employment decisions taken by children.
The basic point of this discussion is that the effect of a macroeconomic crisis on schooling is indeterminate in theory. Children (or their parents) may seek more or less total schooling, they may anticipate or postpone further schooling, and they may expend more or less effort in school (for example, by combining school and work). The total effect of a crisis on schooling will depend on the relative magnitude of the changes in the marginal costs and benefits from education, as well as on the cross-price elasticity of child employment and adult wages.
Not surprisingly, the empirical evidence on the effect of systemic shocks to household income on schooling outcomes is mixed. In the United States, Goldin (1999) finds a large increase in secondary school enrollment rates during the Great Depression, especially in those states that were hardest hit by unemployment. In the LDC setting, Neri and Thomas (2000) suggest that enrollment decisions are unaffected by macroeconomic conditions in Brazil, although grade attainment appears to suffer during a crisis. Cunningham and Maloney (2000) find that girls (but not boys) are more likely to drop out of school during a crisis in Argentina, while both boys and girls are less likely to drop out during crises in Mexico. 2 Using cross-country regressions, Flug, Spilimbergo and Wachtenstein (1998) report that macroeconomic shocks have negative effects on enrollment, and Behrman, Duryea, and Szekely (2000) suggest that the poor macroeconomic prospects of the 1980's in Latin America set back the rate of growth of schooling attainment in the region. In Indonesia, Beegle, Frankenberg and Thomas (1999 ), Cameron (2000 ), Filmer et. al. (2001 and Pradhan and Sparrow (2000) all report some impact of the crisis on enrollment, although the effects tend to be small. Brazil and Mexico), although the sample sizes are also smaller. Moreover, it is rare to have highquality data for a middle -income country which covers the periods before, during, and after a crisis.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the Peruvian setting during this period. Section 3 describes the data used for the analysis; more details on the data can be found in a Data Appendix. In section 4, I describe the econometric specification, and present results. Section 5 concludes.
The Peruvian setting
Economic developments, 1985-1997: Peru followed an erratic economic course in the 1980's and 90's. Between 1985 and 1990, the government of Alan Garcia attempted to stimulate the economy with a "heterodox" stabilization program, which relied, inter alia, on reduced foreign debt payments, a price freeze, and economic reactivation via wage increases, job creation programs, and increased investments in education and health. These policies encouraged high growth rates in 1986 and 87, but the inf lationary pressures and budget deficits quickly proved unsustainable (Glewwe and Hall 1994) . As a result, the country slid into a deep recession and hyper-inflation in 1988. By the end of Garcia's government in 1990, the economy was in a state of near-collapse: GDP per capita had fallen by -10.5%, -13.4%, and -6.9%, and inflation had reached an incredible 667%, 3399%, and 7482%, in 1988, 89, and 90 , respectively (see Figure 1 ).
The economic crisis came hand in hand with a deterioration in public safety: By 1990, there was a state of virtual civil war between the armed forces and the insurgencies of Shining Path and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) in some areas of the country, and the conflict was claiming at least 2,000 lives per year (INEI 1996, p. 58 ).
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The Fujimori government which took office in 1990 opted for more orthodox economic remedies. Economic reforms included the elimination of controls on prices, interest rates, and foreign exchange transactions, the reduction of tariffs, labor market de-regulation, and a far- Public provision of education has traditionally been quite centralized in Peru. In 1991, however, the government initiated a policy of deconcentration to twelve regional governments.
As a result, a growing fraction of resources has been transferred directly to the regions: In 1990, the Ministry of Education managed 71% of total public expenditures on education, and the regions 17%, but by 1997 these figures had been reversed, with the ministry of Education managing 25%, and the regions 56% (World Bank 1999b, Vol. 1, p. 16 ). 9 The regional governments which manage education do not have capacity to raise own revenues, and are appointed by the central government rather than elected.
10
rates in the DHS (61.3%), likely as a result of differences in the wording of the question or in the timing of the survey during the school year. 7 As a comparison, in the Philippines households in the richest quintile spend 20 times as much per student in primary school as households in the poorest quintile, 11 times as much per student in secondary school, and 11 times as much per student at the tertiary level (Schady 2001, p. 34 Table 1a below). It is likely that lack of funding for the 1991 survey, or the dangerous conditions caused by widespread terrorism in the rural sierra in the early 1990's prevented enumerators from visiting outlying, poorer, less well-educated households in this region in 1991.
I therefore limit the sample to Lima and the urban areas of the coast and sierra for all of the analysis. In 1997, these three regions jointly accounted for approximately 58.1% of the population of the country. (Separately, I also run all of the regressions I report in the paper in samples which include the rural sierra. In all of these results, which are available from the author upon request, the crisis impact was larger in absolute value than those I report for the urban sample.) More details on other sources of data and their reliability, as well as on the construction of the variables used for my analysis can be found in a Data Appendix.
Sample means: Tables 1a and 1b Children (or their parents) make decisions about schooling and employment jointly. In so doing, they sort themselves into one of four mutually exclusive categories: Those who attend school only, are employed only, are neither attending school nor employed, and are both attending school and employed. In Tables 1a and 1b, I show unconditional, unweighted means for these four categories, the fraction of children who have completed a standard number of years of schooling by age, and a number of variables which are likely to have an effect on schooling and employment decisions, by survey year. Table 1a presents results for the "full" urban sample (excluding the urban selva, which was not included in the 1991 survey), and for each strata separately. Table 1b breaks down the full urban sample into men and women, and compares the first (poorest) and fifth (richest) income quintiles.
I present results on attendance and employment patterns separately for children aged 6 to 11, roughly corresponding to primary school, and children aged 12 to 17, roughly corresponding to secondary school. Tables 1a and 1b , and Figure 2 show that attendance levels for school-aged children in urban areas are very high throughout: For children aged 6 to 11, the attendance rate is always 97% or higher, while for children aged 12 to 17 it is always 90% or higher. By and large, children go to school in urban Peru. But the extent to which they combine school with work changes dramatically across years. Figure 3 shows that the fraction of children who are working is lower at every age in 1991 than in 1985/86 or 1997. Differences are particularly large for the older children. In the full urban sample, 31% and 21% of children aged 12 to 17 are both attending school and employed in 1985/86 and 1997, respectively. In 1991, by contrast, only 12% of the children in this age group combine school and work. This pattern holds consistently across strata, for girls as well as boys, and for children in the richest and poorest income quintiles.
The 1988-92 crisis is too recent to evaluate its effect on the total amount of schooling chosen by children. However, the data can be used to assess the extent to which children of a certain age have completed a given number of years of schooling. I do this in two ways. First, I
calculate the fraction of children who have completed an appropriate number of years of schooling for their age, by survey year. Children in Peru are expected to start first grade at age 6 or 7. Therefore, unless they start school late or repeat a grade, they should have completed first grade by age 8, second grade by age 9, and so on. I consider children to be "on-track" if they have completed at least this number of school years for their age. Note that this is a generous definition of on-track, as children who start school at age 6 should have completed first grade by age 7.
The second approach I take pools data from the three surveys, and calculates the mean years of schooling completed by children in different birth cohorts. All school-aged children surveyed in 1985/86 were unexposed to the crisis, while all school-aged children surveyed in 1991 were exposed to the crisis. By contrast, there is a discontinuity in exposure for school-aged children surveyed in 1997: Those aged 11 through 17 were exposed to the crisis during their school-aged years, while those aged 6 through 10 were not.
To compare differences in the fraction of children who are on-track across years, I limit the sample to 8 to 10 year-olds. This is because 6 to 7 year-olds are on-track by construction, while children aged 11 and older in 1997 were exposed to the crisis during their school-aged years. Tables 1a and 1b show that, conditional on attendance at school, the fraction of 8 to 10 year-olds who have completed the minimum appropriate number of school years for their age is higher in 1991 than in either 1985/86 or 1997. In the whole sample, 87% of 8 to 10 year-olds were on-track in 1991, but only 72% and 79% in 1985/86 and 1997, respectively. Here too this difference across years holds for all regions, for girls and boys, and for the poorest and richest income quintiles. Note that these comparisons could suffer from selection bias because I condition on attendance-in particular, if "marginal" students who are less likely to make satisfactory progress in school are more likely to start school late or drop out early. I do not think that this is an important source of concern, however, given that there are only very small variations in attendance rates across years. Figure 4 graphs the mean years of schooling completed by age for children exposed and unexposed to the crisis, without conditioning on attendance. The graph also includes a 45 degree line which corresponds to on-track school progression. The results in Figure 4 are very similar to the findings for the probability of being on-track in Tables 1a and 1b . Mean years of schooling are below the ideal on-track progression, especially at higher ages, because of school desertion and the cumulative effects of late school entry and repetition. However, children exposed to the crisis have an average of between .1 and .2 more years of schooling. There is no clear pattern whereby the unexposed children fall further behind or catch up with age.
Econometric specification and results
I next pool the data from the three surveys, and turn to multivariate regressions to estimate differences in school attendance, employment, and school attainment. First, I estimate logit regressions with a dependent variable which takes on the value of one if children are both attending school and working, and zero if they are attending school only. These regressions include dummy variables for the two "non-crisis" years (1985/86 and 1997) , as well as other controls. The omitted category is therefore the "crisis" year of 1991. I report the odds-ratios for the 1985/86 and 1997 dummies, and interpret these as year effects conditional on changes over time in household characteristics. Pervasive, predictable differences across years could be consistent with a causal effect of the 1988-92 crisis on attendance and employment. Second, I
estimate OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is the number of years of schooling completed. These regressions include dummy variables for two survey years, as well as a measure of the number of years that school-aged children were exposed to the crisis. The range of this exposure variable is therefore between zero (children who were never of school-age during the crisis) and five (children who were of school age during every year between 1988 and 1992).
(Details of these exposure calculations can be found in the Data Appendix.) I interpret the coefficients on the measure of exposure as the marginal effect of a year of exposure to the crisis on the years of schooling completed.
In both instances, I report results from a number of specifications. In addition to the survey year dummies (in both the logit and OLS regressions), and the measure of crisis exposure (in the OLS regressions), specification (i) includes strata dummies, gender dummies, and unrestricted age dummies. Information on the years of completed education of both parents (separately) is also available for a sub-sample of children-specifically, those who live in households in which both parents are present and whose relationship to the household head is son or daughter. Specification (ii) therefore adds controls for the education of both parents (separately), unrestricted dummies for the age structure within the household, and a main effect in household size. The LSMS tapes include identifiers with which to map households in the surveys to the districts in which they live. 12 The fixed-effects specification in (iii) limits the analysis to households living in districts which were included in the sample in 1985/86, 1991, and 1997, and includes the variables in specification (ii), as well as a dummy variable for each district. These regressions therefore identify differences in attendance levels, emplo yment levels, and educational attainment from within-district variation across survey years or birth cohorts. (Note that district fixed effects are not a satisfactory solution for the problem of differences in the sample in the rural sierra between the 1985/86 and 1997 surveys on the one hand, and the 1991 survey on the other. The likely problem with the 1991 sample for the rural sierra is that enumerators may not have visited outlying areas within a given district, rather than not visiting outlying districts.) One disadvantage of the estimations which include measures of parental education and those with district fixed effects is that both are limited to sub-samples of the data.
In the three regions considered in the analysis in this paper, we only have data on the schooling of both parents for 73.9% of 6 to 11 year-olds, and only 77.8% of 6 to 11 year-olds live in districts which were included in the sample in 1985/86, 1991, and 1997 . Better controls therefore come at the cost of smaller sample sizes and less precision. suggest that there are no differences in the odds ratios of those who neither attend school nor work across years, while the odds ratios of working only for 12 to 17 year olds relative to both attending school and working are significantly higher in 1997 than in 1991).
Poorer households are more likely to be credit-constrained than their better-off counterparts. Although the means in Table 1b show no clear differences in outcomes between the first and fifth income quintiles, it is conceivable that the regression coefficients I report in Table 2 do not hold for all income levels. To investigate this possibility, I predict log per capita household income on the basis of variables for the age, gender, and education of the household head, and household size and composition. I then run non-parametric (lowess) regressions of the probability of being both employed and in school on predicted log income, by year. (I use predicted income because of the potential endogeneity of income in a child employment regression, but the results are very similar with actual income.) The results, which are presented in Figure 5 , show that the probability of being both in school and employed is lower in 1991 than in 1985/86 and 1997 across the entire income distribution.
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In additional (unreported) specifications, I further test for possible heterogeneity by interacting the year dummies in the logit regressions with (separately) a number of household characteristics, such as the education of the parents, household size, and the strata dummies. The 13 Comparable graphs for the fraction of children who are attending school only, which are essentially the complement of the graphs in Figure 5 given the very small number of children who are neither in school nor working, and those who are working only, show that the fraction of children who are attending school only is highest in 1991 at all income levels.
coefficients on the interaction terms are never significant, suggesting that household responses to the crisis did not vary significantly. completed about one-quarter more school years than those who were entirely unexposed. Since completed schooling only changes by whole integers, one way of interpreting this coefficient is that one out of every four or five fully exposed children will have completed one more year of schooling than the comparable unexposed.
The dummy variable specifications in the lower panel of Table 3 provide weak evidence that school attainment does not increase proportionately with crisis exposure: A "low" amount of crisis exposure-1 to 2 years-appears to have no effect on school attainment, while "high" crisis exposure-3 to 5 years-increases schooling by about 0.2 years. One possible interpretation of this finding is that children or their parents take time to adjust their schooling and employment decisions to a crisis. Too much should not be made of these more nuanced results, however: Ftests on the additional coefficients fail to reject the null that these dummy variable specifications do not represent a significant improvement in fit over the more parsimonious specifications in which crisis exposure enters the regression linearly.
Discussion: Macroeconomic crises can affect the total amount of schooling chosen, the timing of this schooling, and the extent to which schooling is combined with work. The 1988-92 crisis in Peru appears to have reduced access to credit; if anything, this should have led to a reduction in human capital investment during the crisis. The effect of the crisis on the marginal benefits from education is unclear in theory. For this second channel to be part of the explanation of my finding the crisis would have had to be perceived both as persistent and as disproportionately affecting the earnings and employment prospects of low-skilled workers.
Comparisons based on the 1985/86, 1991, and 1997 LSMS suggest that incomes fell substantially for households with heads with different amounts of schooling. 14 Moreover, using data from 14 Glewwe and Hall (1998) report results based on a panel of households in Lima only included in the 1985/86 LSMS and in a follow-up survey conducted in 1990 which suggest that households in which the head had more schooling suffered smaller income losses. I find no clear pattern: A simple tabulation of income by the education of the household head shows that mean income fell by more in households with heads with some secondary education (-41%) than in households with primary education or less (-27%), or annual labor force surveys conducted in Lima, Saavedra (1998) and Saavedra and Maruyama (1998) show that the rate of return to education estimated from a standard Mincerian regression fell noticeably during the crisis (from .11 in 1987 to .08 in 1991), and rose steadily thereafter (to about .13 in 1995). It therefore seems unlikely that changes in access to credit or changes in the marginal benefit to education can explain the patterns in school attendance and completion rates I observe.
The effect of the crisis in Peru on education outcomes appears to have operated through a substantial reduction in forgone income. Real wages in urban areas dropped precipitously during the crisis. The results in Saavedra (1998) crisis, children in Peru were less likely to combine school with work, and they were more likely to make adequate grade progress. Arguably, children who were not working could expend more "effort" in school.
Some possible concerns with interpretation of my results are the effects of late school entry; possible changes in public expenditures on education; changes in the quality of education;
and migration patterns, specifically migration from rural to urban areas. I discuss each of these in turn.
some tertiary education (-25%). The recovery in incomes between 1991 and 1997, by contrast, clearly favored households with more schooling: The incomes of households with heads with primary education or less increased by 2% between 1991 and 1997, by 19% for households with some secondary education, and by 76% for households with some tertiary education. Note that long-term trends in the marginal benefits to schooling are unlikely to account for my results because education attainment improved between 1985/86 and 1991, and worsened between 1991 and 1997. Late school entry may be a concern because of the way I define crisis exposure. There is some evidence from Ghana that parents delay schooling entry if their children are malnourished (Glewwe and Jacoby 1995) . If the 1988-92 crisis in Peru led to a deterioration in nutritional status, then young children surveyed in 1997 whom I have defined as "unexposed" to the crisis (because they were not of school-age during the crisis) may have started school late, and therefore have completed fewer years of schooling for their age than they would have in the absence of the crisis. 15 There is no completely satisfactory way of resolving this problem, but I do not believe that this is the explanation for the patterns I observe. First, enrollment rates for young children are very high throughout, suggesting that late entry is not much of an issue in urban Peru. Finally, migration is a concern because the sample is limited to Lima, and the urban areas of the coast and sierra. In Peru, migration has traditionally been from rural to urban areas, although there appears to have been an important migration from urban to rural areas in the mid-1990's. This reverse migration was a result of the increase in security in the countryside which followed the lower levels of activity of Shining Path and MRTA after 1992, as well as of a deliberate policy designed to encourage resettlement of abandoned rural areas. (This policy included the creation of special government programs, such as PAR, the Programa de Apoyo al
Repoblamiento.) Given lower mean incomes and lower adult education levels in rural areas, a reasonable assumption is that the underlying propensities to attend school and be on-track are lower-or at least no higher-among the migrants than the sedentary population. Another way to think about this is that the migrant populations are likely to have lower "ability" to attend school and make satisfactory grade progress. Rural-to-urban migration would tend to diminish ability in the sample in 1991 relative to 1985/86, while urban-to-rural migration could also diminish ability in 1991 relative to 1997. To the extent that this is the case, the estimates of the effect of the crisis I report would be downward-biased: In the absence of migration, the estimated coefficients on the measures of crisis exposure would have been even larger.
Conclusion
In this paper, I show that the profound economic crisis in Peru between 1988 and 1992 did not have a negative effect on the investments households made in the human capital of their children. Children exposed to the crisis were less likely to combine work with school, and had completed more years of education for their age than those unexposed to the crisis.
The call for a "socially responsible macroeconomic policy" which protects the poor during economic downturns has lately received a great deal of attention (this term, from Lustig 2000). There is no doubt that the poor often suffer disproportionately during crises-both in absolute terms, and because even a small reduction in their incomes can have dramatic effects on their welfare. The analysis in this paper shows, however, that the poor, like other households, are extremely reluctant to make cutbacks in key human capital investments. Indeed, because macroeconomic crises normally depress employment prospects, poor households may rationally choose to invest more, not less, in education.
Programs of targeted cash transfers conditional on behavior such as school attendance have been implemented in a number of Latin American countries, including the PROGRESA program in Mexico, and the Bolsa Escola in Brazil. These programs effectively lower the price of schooling for poor households and, insofar as the demand for schooling is reasonably priceelastic, may increase the schooling attainment of children in poor households. More recently, policy makers have also begun to consider increasing the budgets of these programs during a crisis. The aim of these crisis-induced budget increases would be twofold: To transfer additional income to poor households, and prevent school desertion. Transferring income to poor creditconstrained households during a crisis is likely to substantially increase their welfare. But the results in this paper suggest that the probability of dramatic, crisis-induced increases in school desertion may have been overstated.
Data Appendix
This Data Appendix discusses the reliability of sources of data other than the LSMS surveys which could potentially be used to evaluate the impact of the 1988-92 crises in Peru on education and employment outcomes. I also present details concerning the construction of variables used in the analysis.
Data reliability: I made several attempts to supplement the LSMS with other data, with only limited success. Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) have been conducted in Peru in 1986 Peru in , 1992 Peru in , 1996 Peru in , and 2000 . Unfortunately, the 1986 survey did not collect information on the schooling and employment status of children. The DHS therefore have the disadvantage of not having data for the period before the crisis.
I use national accounts data for a general description of national economic trends in the 1980's and 1990's. Up to 1995, regional branches of INEI also computed estimates of GDP for each one of Peru's 25 departments. These data would have been useful for a difference-indifference analysis of the impact of the crisis. But combining these data with the survey data raises serious problems of measurement error. The department-level pattern of crisis and recovery which comes out of the national accounts data is strikingly varied-indeed, so varied as to seem less-than-credible given anecdotal evidence about the depth of the crisis throughout the country. 18 There are also problems merging these data with the household-level data from the surveys. Only 15 departments were covered in both the 1985/86 and 1991 surveys, and the sample sizes vary wildly across departments-ranging from more than 2,000 individuals between ages 6 to 17 in Lima to less than 50 in some of the smaller departments. A further source of measurement error is introduced by the fact that the department-level GDP figures purport to cover both urban and rural areas, whereas the analysis conducted in this paper is based on the urban samples of Lima, the coast, and the sierra only. For these reasons, I do not provide difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of the crisis.
The Ministry of Education keeps information on total public recurrent and capital expenditures on education during the period, and I use these data to inspect whether changes in school outcomes could be attributed to changes in spending patterns, rather than to changes in the economic environment. These data are considered to be reasonably accurate and comparable over time. I also attempted to use administrative data on enrollment and repetition levels, but discarded these as unreliable. Administrative data on enrollment in various grade levels is define attendance based on two questions in the LSMS: All household members aged 6 or older are first asked whether they are "currently attending school or studying something", and those who answer "no" are then asked whether they "attended school or studied something in the last 12 months". 19 The variable I construct for attendance takes the value of one for all individuals who answer "yes" to either one of these questions. Note that it is important to take into account both these questions, as a large fraction of households in the 1985/86 LSMS were surveyed during the summer vacation months of December though March, so that attendance rates based on only the first question in this survey would appear to be unreasonably low. I also construct a variable for the total number of years of schooling completed based on questions about age and attainment in the surveys.
The measure of employment used in this paper is based on separate questions asked of all household members aged 6 or older. These questions first ask respondents whether they worked "as an employee for a business, corporation, government, a boss, or another individual", and second, whether they worked "for themselves" ("a cuenta propia", or self employed), "as an unpaid family member, or on the (family) farm". The reference period for both questions is the last week; follow-up questions with longer reference periods (12 months) are asked of those who did not work in the last week. For the purposes of this paper, I consider all those who answer affirmatively to any of the four questions to have been employed.
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The Peruvian think-tank GRADE has calculated comparable consumption and income aggregates for the 1985/86, 1991, and 1997 LSMS, as well as for an LSMS conducted in 1994.
Specifically, GRADE used 1997 price deflators to adjust for price differences across natural regions, and the national CPI to deflate consumption and income over time. I use GRADE's income aggregates for the estimations in this paper, but do not use the 1994 LSMS for the analysis because the GRADE aggregates suggest that mean income in this year was lower than in 1991, while the national accounts show a clear improvement in income per capita during this period. It is therefore unclear whether 1994 should be treated as a "crisis" year. 21 In addition to income, I take variables from the LSMS on household composition and size, age, and access to credit. Note: The dependent variable takes on a value of one if children are both attending school and employed, and zero if they are in school only. Children are considered to be employed if they responded affirmatively to any one of the following four questions in the surveys: (i) "In the last 7 days, did you work as an employee for a business, corporation, government, a boss, or another individual?"; (ii) "and in the last 12 months?"; (iii) In the last 7 days, did you work for yourself, ("a cuenta propia", or self employed), or as an unpaid family member, or on the farm?"; (iv) and in the last 12 months?". * Significant at the 10% level or better; ** significant at the 5% level or better; ***significant at the 1% level or better. Standard errors in square brackets are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering. Specification (i) includes strata and gender controls, and a vector of age dummies; specification (ii) supplements specification (i) with variables for the education of both parents (separately), variables for the number of household members under 3, between 3 and 5, between 6 and 8, between 9 and 11, between 12 and 14, and between 15 and 17, as well as a variable for the size of household; the fixed-effects specification in (iii) limits the sample to households living in districts which were included in the sample in 1985/86, 1991, and 1997 , and includes the variables in specification (ii), as well as a dummy variable for each district. Note: The dependent variable is the number of years of schooling completed. * Significant at the 10% level or better; ** significant at the 5% level or better; ***significant at the 1% level or better. Standard errors in square brackets are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering. Specification (i) includes year dummies for 1985/86 and 1997, strata and gender controls, and a vector of age dummies; specification (ii) supplements specification (i) with variables for the education of both parents (separately), variables for the number of household members under 3, between 3 and 5, between 6 and 8, between 9 and 11, between 12 and 14, and between 15 and 17, as well as a variable for the size of household; the fixed-effects specification in (iii) limits the sample to households living in districts which were included in the sample in 1985/86, 1991, and 1997 , and includes the variables in specification (ii), as well as a dummy variable for each district.
